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OFFSHORE MANAGEMENT 
CONSIDERATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 
QUESTIONS RELATED TO FISH, 
OIL, AND WIND 
JOHN A. DUFF* 
Abstract: The United States has depended upon offshore resources 
throughout its history. Past approaches to managing resources such as fish 
and offshore oil raise questions about how the nation might shape new 
regulatory management systems to govern evolving uses and resources 
such as offshore wind power. At the same time, increasing, overlapping, 
and conflicting uses of ocean resources suggest that public land 
management systems ought to be examined to capitalize on terrestrial 
success while avoiding potential pitfalls. Because new technologies and 
uses for offshore resources are emerging at a rapid rate, legislators and 
policyrnakers would do well to ensure that these developments do not lead 
to inadvertent plunder. 
He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts . .. and destroyed the lives 
of our people. 
-The Declaration ofIndependence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
INTRODUCTION 
Europeans, drawn to rich fishing areas, began the settlement of 
North America early in the second millennium (CE).t The "New 
World" economy developed in large part due to a wealth of natural 
resources in combination with advances in the means to harvest those 
resources and integrate them into a marine-based economy. During a 
centuries-long era of freedom on the high seas and open access to 
offshore resources, the notion of private ownership of marine areas or 
resources was unheard of in the region. Conflicts did arise, however, 
* J.D., Suffolk University Law School; LL.M., University of Washington School of Law 
(Law and Marine Affairs); Assistant Professor of Environmental, Coastal and Ocean Sci-
ences, University of Massachusetts at Boston. 
1 For an excellent presentation on the role of the cod fishery in the settlement of 
North America, see generally MARK KURLANSKY, COD: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FISH THAT 
CHANGED "mE WORLD (1997). 
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regarding which nation might have superior rights over marine areas 
or resources. Nevertheless, history and custom supported the notion 
that most marine resources were deemed "unowned" until some hu-
man activity occurred to transform them into "property." 
The importance of ocean and coastal resources to the United 
States and its people can be traced to the nation's genesis. As the rela-
tionship between England and the American colonies strained, the 
sense of "ownership" of offshore resources prompted members of the 
Continental Congress to tie those interests to the colonists' right of 
self-determination as articulated in the Declaration of Independence. 
Yet, while the new nation was able to eject a sovereign deemed to be 
plundering its seas and ravaging its coasts, questions regarding the 
best means of stewarding offshore areas and resources remained. 
This Essay raises a series of questions regarding the manner in 
which the United States has attempted to fashion management sys-
tems to ensure that our offshore resources are no longer plundered. 
Part One sets out a brief background on the laws governing fuga-
cious2 offshore resources. Part Two outlines the legal regimes that 
have been employed in the United States to manage the nation's 
fishery resources. Part Three describes the nation's management re-
gime governing oil and gas deposits located below the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf (OCS.) Part Four highlights the recent debate regarding 
the possible siting of offshore wind farms in the nation's waters. Each 
Part also raises a series of resource management related questions. 
The Conclusion suggests that, as technology spurs new opportunities 
to use offshore areas and resources for an increasing variety of pur-
poses, a new ocean management ethic must be devised to ensure that 
our technological capacity does not lead to inadverten t plunder. 
I. LAWS GOVERNING FUGACIOUS OFFSHORE RESOURCES 
"The trouble with fish," goes the old saw, "is that they swim." The 
statement highlights the fact that, while human beings establish prop-
erty lines and jurisdictional boundaries, fish seem determined to frus-
trate space-based property and governance systems. The problematic 
fish may move from a river governed by municipal ordinances through 
2 Fugacious resources are those resources that, by their very nature, migrate or move 
(often across property lines and/or jurisdictional boundaries). While courts often refer to 
fugacious mineral resources when they talk of the movement of non-living resources (oil, 
gas, certain minerals) this paper uses the term in a broader sense to encompass living 
(e.g., fish) and non-living (e.g., oil and wind) resources. 
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state-ruled seas out into federal waters and ultimately into the marine 
areas governed by another nation, state, or municipality. Who owns the 
fish? Our legal history tells us that no one holds title to the free-
swimming fish and therefore everyone has a right to pursue them. But 
how can one transform the unowned entity into private property? 
John Locke suggested that such a transformation takes place 
when an individual mixes his labor into some unowned thing, thus 
acquiring a legal interest in that thing.3 But the "mixing of labor" 
concept has proven difficult to employ in the courts when more than 
one laborer claims ownership. Common law evolved in the United 
States to recognize title in the individual who could show that he re-
duced the thing to possession, and thus the "rule of capture" was in-
troduced into the law of fugacious resources.4 While one hunter 
might employ considerable time and labor in the process of stalking 
his prey, a subsequent hunter might ultimately capture the resource 
and be deemed owner even when the capture is accommodated by 
the efforts of the prior actor. The courts reason that possession pro-
vides the requisite manifestation to accord property rights in such a 
case.5 Yet the rule of capture must be employed keeping another legal 
interest in mind: the right of access. The rule of capture does not im-
ply that any interested pursuer has a right of access to any and all wild 
resources. As a result, a prospective pursuer must first acquire legal 
access to an area and/or resource to engage in the pursuit. 
A. Access to Pursue Fugacious Resources in Private and Public Space 
To pursue the fugacious resource, the pursuer must have a le-
gitimate right to access the space that will be employed in the pursuit. 
A hunter's claim of ownership pursuant to the rule of capture will be 
frustrated if he is deemed to have been trespassing at the point of 
capture. Accordingly, an owner of real property holds a real and sig-
nificant advantage in pursuing these fleeting resources. His right of 
exclusion affords him more flexibility in employing his labor in the 
effort to reduce the resource to possession. 
But what if the sought-after resource occupies public space, open 
and accessible to all willing to engage in the pursuit? In The Tmgedy of 
~ JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in 1\vo TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 327 
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690). 
4 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
5Id. 
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the C01nmons,6 Garret Hardin pointed out that commons-based re-
sources run the risk of over-exploitation due to the aggregated effect of 
multiple users, each pursuing his own best in terest. The solution sug-
gested by Hardin, as well as a multitude of commentators since, is an 
approach that would control access to the commons to protect them 
from over-exploitation. Methods for controlling access range from 
maintaining each individual's right, but limiting duration and/or 
method of resource extraction, to limiting the number of accessors to 
affording transferable private property rights to accessors. 
Any and all of these methods, however, presume that some en tity 
has a right to control access to the commons. In the United States, 
that presumption is validated by the application of the paTens patriae 
doctrine. The doctrine stems from the notion dating back to English 
common law that the king, as sovereign, held title to public lands and 
resources not as a proprietor, but rather as a trustee for all people. As 
a result, the states, as well as the federal government, exercise author-
ity over the manner in which a wide range of common resources, in-
cluding wild animals, may be exploited.7 
Yet, in their efforts to stem a commons "tragedy," state and/or 
federal governments run the risk of violating their fiduciary responsi-
bilities as trustees. Any limitation of access to heretofore open-access 
resources is arguably a limitation of some beneficiary's right. If access 
is granted to some limited class, or if access is effectively "privatized" 
to some degree-for example, individual transferable quotas for fish, 
lease and extraction rights for oil and gas, or site accommodation and 
permitting for offshore wind farms-what benefit must accrue to the 
trust Tes in consideration for the common beneficial resource thereby 
alienated? The answer is by no means consistent. 
II. FISH 
For the first 200 years of the nation's history, the federal govern-
ment played a limited role in managing U.S. fisheries. Until 1976, the 
United States claimed a three-mile territorial sea-and a somewhat 
wider fishery zone of twelve miles as of 1964-that afforded it the 
right to restrict foreign fishing. Within the three-mile belt of marine 
6 See generally Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243-48 
(1968). 
7 See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S 416 (1920). States are trustees of animals ferae 
naturae within their boundaries, but the federal government retains certain paramount 
powers that may constrain state actions. See id. at 434. 
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waters, the federal government recognized state authority to manage 
fisheries.s While the federal government exercised some effort to 
manage activity by foreign fishing fleets in areas beyond the state-
governed areas, it did not do so comprehensively or effectively. 
By the mid-1970s, technological advances in distant water fishing 
fleets allowed ships to roam the planet's oceans in search of valuable 
fish. European, Asian, and South American boats could be seen off the 
coast of the United States, quickly and efficiently extracting millions of 
dollars worth of fish. With no rules in place to stave off a tragedy of the 
commons, the United States simply decided to fence out unwelcome 
exploiters. In 1976, Congress enacted the Magnuson Fishery Conserva-
tion and Management Act, aimed at excluding foreign fishing and con-
structing a national fisheries management program. The United States 
claimed an expansive Exclusive Fishery Conservation Zone designed to 
encompass some of the world's richest fishing grounds.9 
Yet, the extension to 200 miles did not stem the tragedy. While 
the extended fishery jurisdiction allowed the United States to con-
struct a comprehensive federal fisheries management system in the 
form of eight regional fishery management councils, many U.S. 
fisheries succumbed to the increasing pressure of a growing and in-
creasingly efficient U.S. fishing industry. Twenty years into the U.S. 
exclusive managemen t system, many of the nation's most valuable fish 
and shellfish stocks were deemed overfished.lO 
Today, fishery managers struggle with the realization that they 
must make difficult decisions regarding access to these fisheries. They 
recognize the economic impact that will be visited upon fishing com-
munities as restrictions are employed. Yet, the obligation to prevent 
overfishing and rebuild those stocks deemed overfished presents them 
with few options. One option that has been available to fishery manag-
ers exists in the form of Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs). An IFQ ap-
proach would allow fishery managers to determine a given fishery'S 
total allowable catch (TAC) based on its current status and population 
dynamics, and then to allocate shares of that TAC to individual fishers. 
8 See Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (a) (2000). 
9 See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1801 
(b)(l) (2000). 
10 See NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., REPORT TO CONGRESS: STATIlS OF FISHERIES OF 
THE UNITED STATES (1997), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/Fstatus.html (last visited Jan. 
19,2004). 
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The promise and criticisms regarding the employment of IFQs are well 
stated in the literature.ll 
As managers consider remedies for problems that have befallen 
our fisheries, questions related to the government in its role as trustee 
arise. 
A Has the Government Met Its Fiduciary Duty in Managing Fishery Resources? 
While it can be argued that, in the case of federal fisheries, man-
agers are violating their fiduciary duty vis-a-vis their failure to prevent 
overfishing, such a claim would likely fail in court due to the lack of 
specificity embodied in the trust governing the parens patriae capacity of 
the governmen t. Even where smaller classes of beneficiaries have 
brought an action against the federal government for failing to meet its 
fiduciary trust responsibilities, courts have been hesitan t to hear such 
cases unless sufficien t detail in a trust relationship can be shown.12 
B. How Should the Governnumt Account for Its Fishery Management Practices? 
As a citizen of the United States, each of us can don our 
"beneficiary" cap, and legitimately ask: "what's in it for me?" If I have 
been fenced out of the fisheries because I do not have the requisite his-
tory that will provide me with a license or an IFQ. how can the gov-
ernment account for its actions? They seem to have taken even my 
"right" of access-never mind my "right" to some share of the actual 
fish. The careful reader of federal fishery laws realizes quickly however, 
that, while he may be a beneficiary of a fish-laden trust, he has no rec-
ognizable property right to the fish. The drafters of the Magnuson Act 
were at least wise enough to characterize the legal interest of any indi-
II See, e.g., Ransom E. Davis, Individually Transferable QJlotas and The Magnuson Act: Cre-
ating Economic Efficiency in Our Nation's Fisheries, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 267 (1996); 
Harry N. Scheiber & Christopher J. Carr, From Extended Jurisdiction to Privatization: Interna-
tional Law, Biology, and Economics in the Marine Fisheries Debates, 1937-1976, 16 BERKELEY J. 
INT'L L. 10 (1998); Alex Tynberg, The Natural Step and Its Implication for a Sustainable Future, 
7 HASTINGS W.-Nw.J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 73 (2000). 
12 In United States v. Navajo Nation, the Supreme Court ruled that to state a claim for 
breach of trust, a tribe, as the beneficiary of a trust managed by the federal government 
(as trustee), "must identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or 
other duties, and allege that the Government has failed faithfully to perform those duties." 
See 537 U.S. 488, 490 (2003). The Court noted that, "[a]lthough 'the undisputed existence 
of a general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people' can 'rein-
force' the conclusion that the relevant statute or regulation imposes fiduciary duties, that 
relationship alone is insufficient" to support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on 
violation of statute. See id. (internal citation omitted). 
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vidual or group allowed access to an otherwise limited-access fishery as 
a "privilege."13 Having explicitly distinguished such an interest from a 
property "right," the government protected itself against a future claim 
that any restriction or abolition of the interest should be compensable 
as a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Further, a claim of loss of beneficial interest might prompt an 
arguably legitimate response from the government in the form of a 
reference to seafood prices. A studious government representative 
could point to the variety of seafood available and the reasonable 
prices they command. The beneficial interest, they might suggest, 
comes in the form ofa retail price unburdened by a royalty that might 
otherwise be charged to fishers. But is that benefit achieved byallow-
ing uncompensated access to a limited number of fishers? Or is it the 
result of invading the principal, rather than living on the interest, of 
the fishery trust? If it is the laUer, my benefits are likely to disappear 
quickly. Alternatively, my benefit also seems to evaporate if I cannot 
fish and I do not eat fish. 
Is it time for our fisheries managers to quantifY what they have left 
in the trust, rather than what has been taken out in the form of land-
ings figures and market prices? In the realm of a trust discussion, it 
seems sensible, if not obligatory, to have the trustees provide the 
beneficiaries with something beyond a statement of withdrawals. A 
statement that includes a beginning balance, a description of invest-
ments made, a reference to losses sustained due to influences beyond 
the trustees' control-for example, weather or "outsider" fishing in 
straddling areas, a list of withdrawals taken, and an ending balance might 
be nice. 
III. OILl4 
Offshore drilling in the United States began over 100 years ago as 
piers were constructed and extended from the coast of California}5 
Individual states, notably California, Texas, and Louisiana, claimed 
15 16 U.S.C. § 1851 (a) (4). 
14 The discussion on oil is taken in part from a previous work. SeeJohn Alton Duff, RDy-
alty Relief Act Spurs Oil and Gas Exploration in Deep Waters of the Gttlf of Mexico: United States 
&tifies Maritime Boundary Treaty with Mexico, in 14 OCEAN YEARBOOK 203-31 (Elisabeth 
Mann Borgese et aI. eds., 2000). 
15. See Charles Lester, Contemporary Federalism and New Regimes of Ocean Governance: Lessons 
from the Cose of Outer Continental Shelf Oil Development, 23 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 7 (1994) 
(citing MINERALS MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR. OFFSHORE RESOURCE EVALUATION 
PROGRAM: BACKGROUND & FUNCTIONS, OCS REpORTMMS 85-0091, 9 (1986)). 
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title to the submerged lands and obtained the revenue from such 
lands leased to oil and gas companies. 
In 1945, President Truman proclaimed exclusive jurisdiction over 
the resources on and below the OCS of the United States.16 He did so 
as part of an effort to put the nations of the world on notice of the 
territorial claim. Officials in the United States indicated that the OCS 
claimed pursuant to the Truman Proclamation amounted to ap-
proximately 750,000 square miles, but that the reach of the claim was 
likely limited to the 600-foot isobath,17 The U.S. State Department 
indicated that the Truman Proclamation was made, in large part, 
based on the belief that the submerged lands of the United States, 
particularly those in the western Gulf of Mexico, constituted a poten-
tial wealth of petroleum deposits.1s They also acknowledged the role 
16. Proclamation No. 2667. 10 Fed. Reg. 12.303 (Sept. 28. 1945). reprinted in 4 White-
man DIGEST § 2. at 756-57. President Truman stated. in part: 
Id. 
Now. Therefore. I. Harry S. Truman. President of the United States of 
America. do hereby proclaim the following policy of the United States of 
America with respect to the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of 
the continental shelf. 
Having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing its 
natural resources. the Government of the United States regards the natural 
resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high 
seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the 
United States. subject to its jurisdiction and control. In cases where the conti-
nental shelf extends to the shores of another State. or is shared with an adja-
cent State. the boundary shall be determined by the United States and the 
State concerned in accordance with equitable principles. The character as 
high seas of the waters above the continental shelf and the right to their free 
and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus affected. 
17 Press Release. White House (Sept. 28. 1945). reprinted in 4 Whiteman DIGEST § 2. at 
757-58. The Press Release stated: 
Id. 
The policy proclaimed by the President in regard to the jurisdiction over the 
continental shelf ... will ... make possible the orderly development of an 
underwater area 750.000 square miles in extent. Generally. submerged land 
which is contiguous to the continent and which is covered by no more than 
100 fathoms (600 feet) of water is considered as the continental shelf. 
18 Id. The White House Press Release also stated: 
Petroleum geologists believe that portions of the continental shelf beyond the 
three-mile limit contain valuable oil deposits. The study of sub-surface struc-
tures associated with oil deposits which have been discovered along the Gulf 
coast of Texas. for instance. indicates that corresponding deposits may under-
lie the offshore or submerged land. The trend of oil-productive salt domes 
extends directly into the Gulf of Mexico off the Texas coast. Oil is also being 
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of advancing technology as a reason for claiming the appurtenant 
submerged lands.19 As the value of offshore oil and gas resources be-
came apparent, a domestic dispute arose in the United States between 
the state and federal governments. 
Federal officials interpreted the Truman Proclamation as a claim 
against the individual states as well as against foreign nations. They 
argued that lease revenues ought to accrue to the federal rather than 
state treasuries. Less than one month after Truman claimed the sub-
merged lands appurtenant to the United States as against the rest of 
the world, the United States Attorney General claimed the seabed and 
its minerals as against the individual states.20 
In a case pitting the federal govern men t against the State of Cali-
fornia, the United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the federal 
government, effectively placing into federal hands what the states had 
been managing since 1896.21 Subsequent Supreme Court cases in 
1950 affirmed the fact that the federal government, and not the indi-
vidual states, owned and controlled the submerged oil and gas re-
serves ofthe U.S. portions of the Gulf of Mexico. 22 
The individual states, particularly those states adjacen t to the Gulf 
of Mexico, sought to reclaim the submerged lands in some manner. 
They mounted a series of efforts in Congress to have the submerged 
lands transferred from federal to state ownership. Congress was eager 
[d. 
[d. 
taken at present from wells within the three-mile limit off the coast of Cali-
fornia. It is quite possible. geologists say. that the oil deposits extend beyond 
this traditional limit of national jurisdiction. 
19 [d. Additionally. the Press Release noted: 
The advance of technology prior to the present war had already made possi-
ble the exploitation of a limited amount of minerals from submerged lands 
within the three-mile limit. The rapid development of technical knowledge 
and equipment occasioned by the war now makes possible the determination 
of the resources of the submerged lands outside of the three-mile limit. With 
the need for the discovery of additional resources of petroleum and other 
minerals. it became advisable for the United States to make possible orderly 
development of these resources. The proclamation of the President is de-
signed to serve this purpose. 
20 SeeJOSEPHJ. KALO ETAL .• COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 287 (1994) (noting that on Oc-
tober 19, 1945, the U.S. Attorney General filed suit on behalf of the United States against 
the state of California). 
21 United Statesv. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). 
22 See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 
699 (1950). 
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to resolve the dispute. Legislative history indicates that the federal legis-
lators recognized the strategic importance of oil and gas development, 
particularly from the submerged lands of the Gulf of Mexico, and 
sought to put to rest "the interminable litigation over these areas in-
volving the Federal and State governments."23 The first attempts to 
solve the dispute were vetoed by President Truman.24 The states ulti-
mately succeeded in 1953 as Congress passed, and newly-elected Presi-
dent Eisenhower signed the Submerged Lands Act (SLA) , which estab-
lished state title in the submerged lands out to three miles.25 
23 H.R. REP. No. 83-215 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1385, 1386. Legislative 
history for the bill that would ultimately become the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 made 
particular note of reconciling the federal-state dispute and establishing a stable framework 
upon which industry could rely. Id at 1385-86. The Legislative History states that: 
In this almost interminable debate over the disposition of these sub-
merged lands, one area of agreement shines like a beacon in this sea of de-
bate-that is the acute and vital necessity of the immediate enactment of leg-
islation to promote the exploration and development of the petroleum 
deposits known to be located in these areas. 
The need for oil in the United States at the present time is commonly 
known. The strategic importance of oil to our economy and our defense ef-
forts demand immediate action to alleviate a growing menace to our national 
welfare. Today, as in the past, persons, regardless of their views as to the 
proper solution of the disposal of these lands, have urged immediate enact-
ment of legislation to permit development. 
Moreover, the interminable litigation over these areas involving the Fed-
eral and State Governments as well as individual applicants has added noth-
ing but confusion and controversy toward a proper solution of the problem. 
Such a state must not be permitted to exist indefinitely for the best interests 
of all parties involved. 
In view of such conditions and circumstances, it is the opinion of the 
committee that to perpetuate this intolerable delay in the improvement of 
these lands because of the absence of legislation must not be continued. 
Since the court decisions in the cases involving the States of California, 
Louisiana, and Texas, new development of the vast potentialities located in 
these lands has been brought almost to a complete standstill, particularly in 
the Gulf of Mexico. The litigation which was the primary cause of these stop-
pages threatens to further retard any progress. Therefore, the committee 
feels that permanent legislation covering all phases of this litigation must be 
enacted. 
Id. at 1386. 
24 For a brief history ofthe legislative attempts ofl951 and 1952, see id. at 1386-87. For a 
veto message of President Harry S. Truman, see Tidelands Bill Veto, 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 908-
13. 
25 Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1312 (2000); see also Lester, supra note 15, 
at 10 (noting that one of President Eisenhower's campaign pledges in 1952 was to return 
ownership of the submerged lands to the states). The state submerged lands off the gulf 
coasts of Florida and Texas extend approximately nine miles pursuant to their original 
sovereign charters. See United Statesv. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 121 (1960). 
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A. Leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf 
While engineering technology up to that time had limited oil and 
gas production technology to the three-mile band that was once again 
in the hands of the states, Congress foresaw the time when the federal 
government would be leasing the federal submerged lands three 
miles and further from shore. Shortly after conferring the near-shore 
submerged lands to the states, Congress enacted the Outer Continen-
tal Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) which, inter alia, delegated to the Secre-
tary of Interior the power to lease and regulate the resources of the 
OCS.26 OCSLA codified and modified the Truman Proclamation of 
1945. It claimed exclusive federal jurisdiction of the resources in the 
OCS seaward of the submerged lands conferred to the states via the 
SLA. OCSLA established policies that would govern leasing of the 
federal submerged lands for oil and gas exploration and production.27 
The most lucrative offshore oil and gas extraction takes place in 
the western and central Gulf of Mexico, which provide approximately 
one sixth of the nation's domestic oil and one fourth of its natural 
gas. Under the federal leasing system, a company seeking access to 
OCS lands in the U.S. area of the Gulf of Mexico must make pay-
ments to the federal government in two ways. First lease tracts are 
"sold" at auction. The successful bidder obtains the right to explore 
for, as well as develop and produce, minerals from the lease tract.28 
The initial lease period for a tract is between five and ten years with a 
subsequent extension if oil and gas continue to be produced "in pay-
ing quantities."29 The second type of payment is the royalty payment 
due on each barrel of oil (or gas equivalen t) actually extracted. 
As the technology developed and the demand for oil and gas 
increased, the industry pushed exploration further offshore until, in 
1947, the first rigs were placed out of sight of land.30 The move to 
deeper waters required significant technological advancements. In 
1952, state-of-the-art technology still limited drilling to 100 feet of wa-
26 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2000). 
27Id. §§ 1334-1356. 
28Id. § 1331 (c). For statutory definitions of the terms "exploration," "development," 
and "production" see id. § 1331(k)-(m). The term "minerals" i~ defined at § 1331(q). A 
"lease tract" is an area not exceeding 5760 acres. Id. § 1337(b) (I). 
29 Id. § 1337(b) (2). 
30 Leonard LeBlanc, 1947 Shaking the Bounds of Land, 1997 Probing 10,000 ft. Depths, 
OFFSHORE, May 1,1997, at 82,82. 
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ter.31 The technology for offshore drilling did not advance dramati-
cally at first. Eventually offshore barge drilling-whereby a barge was 
sunk to the bottom and could be refloated to move from drillsite to 
drill site-allowed for oil and gas extraction in water depths up to 300 
feet. Drilling at 300 foot-plus-depths required floating drillships with 
equipment capable of being moored to withstand wind and currents 
as well as stabilizing equipmen t to compensate for the roll and pitch 
of a surging sea.32 
Exploration in 1000 foot-plus-depths required another quantum 
leap in engineering technology. Dynamic stationing, first used in 1961 
and successfully used in 20,000 feet of water by the Glomar Chal-
lenger in 1969, allowed mooring without anchors.33 This anchorless 
method of mooring uses position referencing systems to feed infor-
mation to a drillship's thrusters to maintain the ship's location rela-
tive to the subsea well.34 By 1970, the technology existed to drill in 
2000 feet of water, and actual exploratory drilling was taking place at 
1400 feet.35 The oil embargo of 1973 and 1974 focused national atten-
tion on the need to better develop domestic oil and gas supplies in an 
effort to minimize dependency on inlportS. OCS lands, especially 
those off the coasts of Texas and Louisiana were increasingly explored 
and exploited to maintain a healthy domestic production level. 
In the early 1980s a n umber of firms embarked on efforts to con-
struct and install production platforms in one thousand foot-plus 
depths. Exxon succeeded in 1983.36 While the technology existed to 
drill at depths measured in miles rather than feet, the economics in-
volved did not justify most deepwater activity. The labor and capital 
costs, along with leasing and royalty payments, exceeded the revenue 
and acceptable profit that could be derived from deepwater drilling. 
The technology continued to advance, but the progress further off-
shore was theoretical rather than practical. 
By 1983, companies were drilling in one-mile-plus depths of wa-
ter and the engineers boasted of the ability to reach beyond two miles 
in depth.37 In 1988, Shell con tracted with Sonat Offshore Drilling to 
31 See Dillard Hammett, Deepwater Dlilling-Foresight, Risk, and Reward, 22 EXPLORATION 
& ECON. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 227,231 (1984). 
32 Id. at 232-33. 
33 Id. at 233-34. 
34 Id. at 234-35. 
35 Id. at 231. 
36 See C.L. Wickizer, Challenges of Future Deepwater Operations Examined, OIL & GAS J., 
Oct. 24, 1988, at 64. 
37 See id. 
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drill a well in the Gulf of Mexico 7520 feet under the water. In recen t 
years, advances have been made in both exploration techniques and 
platform design and construction. Three-dimensional seismic sensing 
technology provided a finer and more detailed look at prospective oil 
and gas reserves lying under submerged lands.3s At the same time, 
platforms such as Shell's Auger proved that oil can successfully be ex-
tracted from wells more than half a mile below the water's surface.39 
Today the western portion of the Gulf of Mexico remains one of 
the few open and productive areas for production.40 As supplies from 
relatively shallow-less than 200 meters-depths were depleted, the 
costs of exploration and exploitation rose. As a result, oil and gas 
production in the Gulf of Mexico waned in the 1980s and early 1990s 
and with it the regional economies of Texas and Louisiana. Neverthe-
less, exploration continued. 
In late 1996, twenty-three rigs operated in Gulf of Mexico waters 
exceeding 1000 feet. In addition, Conoco recently contracted with a 
Korean ship manufacturer for a vessel capable of drilling in 10,000 
feet ofwater.41 
Technological advances aside, deepwater drilling faced a major 
economic impediment in the form of royalty payments due immedi-
ately upon extracting oil and gas from federally leased offshore sites. 
These up-front and continuous costs, claimed the industries, consti-
tuted the final barrier to reaching vast amoun ts of previously un-
tapped energy resources.42 Oil and gas producers argued that royalty 
relief was necessary to allow the potential of technological advances to 
be unleashed. In the mid-1990s, the oil and gas industries were mak-
ing a concerted effort to restructure the economic burdens in order 
to unleash the technological potential. 
38 Hillary Durgin, A New Day for Oil, HOUSTI>N CHRONICLE, June 30, 1996, at A16. 
39 The Auger recently surpassed the 100,000 barrels-per-day mark. See Shell's Auger & 
Mars Platforms Pass Mark, ENERGY ALERT, Aug. 20, 1997, 1997 WL 9037228. The Auger is 
Shell's tension platform in the Gulf; see also Marshall De Luca, Seventy U.S. Gulf Deepwater 
Fields Awaiting Development; Twenty-six in Production, OFFSHORE, Sept. 1997, at 38 (describing 
discoveries during 1997 and records set in water depth production, tieback distance to a 
platform, and subsea installation). 
40 The western portion of the Gulf, those areas referred to as the western and central 
planning areas, lie west of 87°30' in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 
41 Gulf Production Has Serious Challenges of Equipment, Technology, Regulations, THE EN-
ERGY REPORT, May 19,1997,1997 WL 8928018. 
42 The Outer Continental Shelf Enhanced Exploration and Deep Water Incentives Act: Hearings 
Before the Oceanography, Gulf of Mexico and OCS Subcommittee, Merch. Marine and Fisheries 
Comm., 103rd Congo 65-76 (1993) (testimony of Robert B. Stewart, President, National 
Ocean Industries Association). 
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Until 1996, the means by which the Secretary of Interior could 
encourage deepwater production was limited to the offer of an ex-
tended initial lease period-for example, an offer of an eight- or ten-
year lease rather than a five-year lease,43 Royalties, however, would still 
be due and payable upon production. As a result, companies seeking 
to develop deepwater tracts might incur higher initial capital costs 
along with higher variable costs for producing at great depths, but 
they would be required to pay the same royalty rate as a producer on a 
substantially shallower tract. While the Secretary could apply a higher 
royalty rate, the minimum was set at 12.5 percent by statute. 
B. Accommodating the Exploiters to Serve the Beneficiaries-The Move for 
Royalty &lief 
Members of Congress from the states whose economies stood to 
benefit most from continued oil and gas development sought opportu-
nities to jump start oil and gas exploration in the Gulf of Mexico. "Roy-
alty relief," or a method of allowing a certain amount of royalty free 
production, seemed to offer a solution. But the concept faced a three-
and-a-half-year. battle through three different sessions of Congress, two 
presidential administrations, and the "Republican Revolution" of 1994, 
before it was finally enacted in November of 1995. Royalty relief was a 
hotly contested concept in Congress and came to fruition only after 
years of debate and political strategic drives by the affected industries. 
Opponents of the idea labeled it "corporate welfare" and argued that it 
was an unnecessary economic incentive to an industry which would 
have proceeded with deep water drilling with or without royalty relief.44 
The critics argued that the oil and gas industries would reap windfall 
benefits at U.S. taxpayers' expense. The financial benefit to, or the 
drain on, the federal treasury was open to conjecture. 
C. The Mechanics of Royalty &lief 
The Department of Interior, through the Minerals Management 
Service (MMS), administers the leasing of OCS lands to oil and gas 
companies. The MMS operates under an obligation to lease the lands 
through a competitive bid process and to charge a royalty rate for all 
oil and gas extracted. Under the OCS leasing provisions, the mini-
mum royalty rate is 12.5 percent of the value of the oil and gas ex-
43 [d. § 1337(b) (2) (B). 
44 See, e.g., 141 CONGo REC. H7481, 7485 (1995) (statement of Rep. Miller). 
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tracted.45 Royalties on OCS oil and gas production amount to hun-
dreds of millions of dollars annually. 
The royalty relief provisions enacted by Congress in 1995 seemed 
relatively straightforward. They are designed to "promote developmen t 
or increased production" on existing lease tracts and to "encourage 
production of marginal resources" on existing and unleased tracts in 
the deepwater areas of the Gulf of Mexico.46 They do so by removing 
the immediate royalty payments for a certain level of production based 
on the depth from which the oil and gas are recovered. As a result, oil 
and gas companies which would otherwise forego production in certain 
areas because immediate royalty payments were due, could now reduce 
their costs of production and drill in deeper waters. 
Pursuant to the Act, royalty relief applies to the western and cen-
tral planning areas of the Gulf of Mexico.4' The "relief" was tiered such 
that greater depths afford greater relief. Accordingly, no royalties are 
due for tracts leased in the five-year period following the law's enact-
ment for: (l) "17.5 million barrels of oil equivalent for leases of water 
depths of 200 to 400 meters;" (2) "52.5 million barrels of oil equivalen t 
for leases in 400 to 800 meters of water;" and (3) "87.5 million barrels 
of oil equivalen t for leases in water depths greater than 800 meters. "48 
The Act succeeded in spurring interest in leasing deepwater tracts 
of the western and central regions of the Gulf of Mexico. Over the 
course of the last eight years, leasing of tracts in waters less than 200 
meters has declined. Yet deepwater tract leasing has risen dramatically 
and oil production in the Gulf of Mexico has risen by seven ty perc en t. 49 
Offshore oil and gas management in the United States provides a 
substantial portion of the nation's fuel and accrues billions of dollars 
to the federal treasury in the form of lease paymen ts and royalties. As 
a well-established and lucrative offshore resource management re-
gime, a natural question emerges: can this model be employed in new 
or evolving marine resource management regimes? In particular, can 
it be employed as the United States looks seaward and considers off-
shore wind energy production? 
45 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1) (4) (2000). 
46 [d. 
47 The EEZ in the Gulf of Mexico west of 87°30'. 
48 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (a)(3) (C) (ii). 
49 See CHRIS OYNES, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., A REVIEW OF DEEPWATER OPERATIONS 
(Sept. 2003), at http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/whatsnew/speeches/Deepwater%20-
Operations.pdf (last visited Jan. 19,2004). 
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IV. WIND 
Unlike offshore resources such as fish or fossil fuels located be-
low the nation's OCS, the notion of wind as a trust resource is rela-
tively new. As indicated above, existing management regimes raise 
questions. In the case of offshore wind, no managemen t regime cur-
rently exists, but the questions that are being asked could determine 
the contours of a regime designed to promote offshore wind to the 
benefit of the public res. Who owns the fish? Who owns the OCS and 
its oil and gas reserves? We have been detailing the answers to these 
questions for decades. 
But who owns the wind? Is it a resource that ought to be man-
aged by our sovereigns for the benefit of our people? And if so, which 
models can we employ? Is it an attribute of private property or is it 
ferae naturae? Is it a severable estate akin to mineral rights and surface 
rights? Does it become a public trust resource when it moves across 
public space? These questions no longer reside exclusively in the 
minds of property law studen ts and professors. 
The recent debate regarding the proposed siting of an offshore 
wind farm in Nantucket Sound highlights the need for an examina-
tion of wind as a natural resource. The proponents of the project, 
Cape Wind Associates, contend that the absence of a regulatory re-
gime suggests that none was intended.50 In comparison to the efforts 
to extract fish or fossil fuels there seems to be, at least at first glance, a 
basis for such a contention. Do wind farms pose a "Tragedy of the 
Commons" risk? Is there a danger that all the wind will be extracted? 
The casual observer might answer no. But the "Tragedy" does not be-
come visible until some resource becomes readily available to a 
sufficient number of users. There is no doubt that for centuries sailors 
have moved their ships across the seas eager to steal another's wind or 
at least avoid the lee on a calm day. 
A. Wind as a Compensable Pmperty Interest 
The winds of Nantucket Sound hold tremendous potential. One 
day they may light the homes of New England. As a recreational re-
source they provide sailors, surfers, and overheated beachgoers with 
50 Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 288 F. Supp. 2d 64 
(D. Mass. 2003). Proponents have acknowledged the requirement to acquire permits from 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers under ·Section 10" of the Rivers and Harbors Appro-
priation Act of 1899 allowing placement of structures into the waters of the United States 
that may obstruct navigation. Id. 
2004] Offshore Management Considerations: Fish, Oil, and Wind 401 
pleasure and relief. So long as they can reach the wind-swept area, 
users need not pay a fee for enjoying the breeze. But as a commercial 
resource, the winds of Nantucket Sound merit scrutiny. Some suggest 
that those who endeavor to turn wind currents into electrical currents 
ought to pay for the wind-or at least the access to it on public lands. 
In fact, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) recently out-
lined its approach to siting, managing, and regulating wind energy 
projects on BLM lands in a guidance document. The policy document 
"encourages the development of wind energy in acceptable areas" and 
includes provisions on right-of-way rental fees to be paid by operators 
of testing systems and wind-energy developmen t projects.51 
The move by the BLM supports the notion that the managers of 
public lands ought to construct siting criteria, payment systems, and 
compatibility analyses for any and all applications to construct wind 
energy data collection structures and ultimately wind turbines them-
selves. Managers of public lands and offshore areas would do well to 
examine the private wind market as well. Over the course of the last ten 
years, an increasing number of landowners whose lands are graced with 
consistent winds have negotiated contracts with wind energy develop-
ers.52 The wind, it seems, is theirs to sell. Of course, there are risks to 
recognizing the wind as a compensable interest. In a 1997 land con-
demnation case in California, a state appeals court ruled that wind power 
rights are capable of segregation and therefore must be paid for in the 
event a state condemnation knocks the wind out of a property owner.53 
CONCLUSION 
As offshore resources become the subject of increasing economic 
desire, marine resource managers must contemplate their roles and 
responsibilities in managing offshore areas. Some have suggested that 
"ocean zoning" is the answer to ocean management issues, while tra-
ditional users of state and federal ocean space decry any efforts they 
51 KA'llILEEN CLARKE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, INTERIM WIND ENERGY DEVELOP-
MENT POLICY (Oct. 2002). http://www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/wo/ty03/im2003-020.htm (last 
visited Jan. 19,2004). 
52 Susan Warren, Where the Wind Blows, Landowners Find Profits, WALL ST. j., Oct. 30, 
1996, at T1 (citing an Alternative Energy Institute study indicating that "landowners can 
negotiate an up-front development fee of $5,000 to $10,000, and either a yearly fee for 
each turbine placed on the property, a royalty based on production (usually 2% to 5% of 
revenue), or a combination of both"). 
53 Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1997). 
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perceive as "fencing them out" of the areas they depend upon. But 
the fact is that "zoning" is a legal tool employed to characterize the 
types of activity/building/development/use that may take place on 
private lands. Ocean areas are public space. As a result, the more apt 
models that ought to be considered in assessing ocean space/resource 
manage men t issues are those models that have been employed to 
manage other public areas and resources. 
The history of public land management in the United States sug-
gests that, as trustees of public areas and resources, our governmen ts, 
both state and federal, would do well to look to the land as they con-
sider stewarding our seas. Through processes of designation and 
withdrawal, sound use and appropriate conservation, we may be able 
to emulate some of our public land successes while avoiding certain of 
our public land debacles. 
Given the long history of a wide range of uses of ocean areas, the 
general principles articulated in the federal government's Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) are worth keeping in 
mind as ocean managers consider the increasing pressures on our off-
shore resources. In drafting the FLPMA, Congress established a set of 
principles-paraphrased here-to be employed in the management 
of millions of acres of federal land under the authority of the BLM: 
• Don't sell public lands, do inventory them; 
• Plan for present and future use; 
• Establish rules and regulations after considering views of general 
public; 
• Establish goals and objectives as guidelines for public land nse 
planning; 
• Manage on basis of multiple use and sustained yield; 
• Manage to protect scientific/scenic/historical/ecological/en-
vironmental/ air and atmospheric/water resource/archeological 
values; 
• Preserve and protect certain public lands in their natural condi-
tion; 
• Obtain fair market value of the use of the public lands and re-
sources.54 
We have moved significant commercial and recreational interests out 
to sea, it is time to send our governance responsibilities out as well. 
54 See Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000). 
